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Fitzgerald, be made into a kind of witchcraft, a kind of music?and if a 
man is a poet, he can do that. 
After all, what do the meanings of verses mean? They stand for very 
little. If I say, for example, "And shake the yoke of inauspicious stars/ 
From this world-weary flesh," we may not believe in astrology, but the 
verses are very fine. (They are by Shakespeare, incidentally.) And then of 
course we have the many Saxon words and the fine Latin word, "inaus 
picious": "And shake the yoke of inauspicious stars." Then the Saxon 
words, "From this world-weary flesh," that have come out of Old English 
poetry: there you have witchcraft. And that is not enough. For example, 
when Shakespeare wrote, 
Music to hear, why hear'st thou music sadly? 
Sweets with sweets war not, joy delights in joy: 
Why lov'st thou that which thou receiv'st not gladly? 
you should feel that the idea of being amazed at someone enjoying sad 
music is really a silly idea. I think I could feel the beauty of "Sweets with 
sweets war not, joy delights in joy," even without comprehending the mean 
ing of the words, since the meaning is after all something added to the 
verses. The verses stand for a witchcraft of their own: they are strange verb 
al objects in their own right. 
And now, I suppose I have spoken too much.... 
CRITICISM / ROBERT SCHOLES 
The Reality of Borges 
"Fame is a form of incomprehension, 
perhaps the worstr J. L. B. 
My title is presumptuous?as is the very act of writing about an author 
who is not only well-known but has actually shaped many of our percep 
tions about the possibilities of literature. Borges needs neither praise nor 
explanation from me or anyone else. My discussion of him, then, must be 
neither of these, though it may partake of both. It is a personal statement 
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in the form of a modest fiction: the creation of a character named Borges, 
based on certain documents that have 
appeared in the English language 
bearing that name. The title of this performance might have been even 
more presumptuous?"Borges and I"?or, most presumptuous, "My Borges." 
My Borges writes in English, of course, though he has gone to some 
lengths to disguise this fact. Sometimes his works appear as translations 
made by people with patently fictional names like Norman Thomas di Gio 
vanni. On other occasions he has published poems, designating these Eng 
lish texts as translations made by some of the finest poets of our day. Talk 
of presumption! He has enough for both of us. He has even gone so far 
as to arrange for publication of his works in the Spanish language, in 
rather pedestrian versions, which often read like too literal copies of the 
English originals. If there really is a Norman Thomas di Giovanni, perhaps 
he is 
responsible for this hackwork.* 
The ingenuity of Borges in disguising his true situation can hardly be 
credited. He has gone to the incredible length of planting different versions 
of his English texts, sometimes so strikingly at odds that mere error can 
hardly account for the differences. Let me cite an instance of this, in which 
he has clearly overplayed his hand. In a book called Other Inquisitions, in a 
text bearing the possibly spurious dateline Buenos Aires, December 23, 
1946, he writes of a supposed ancestor who 
left Argentine letters some memorable poetry, and who tried to reform 
the teaching of philosophy by purifying it of theological shadows and 
exposing the principles of Locke and Condillac. He died in exile; like 
all men, he was born at the wrong time. (OI, 172) 
And in another book called Labyrinths he has given us a different version 
of this same text, which could easily be mistaken for another and more lit 
eral translation of some Spanish original. In this version, though the date is 
the same, it is presented in the European and Latin American style, with 
the number first: 23 December 1946. The text itself is even more blatantly 
manipulated. This same "ancestor," who has now become a "forebear," is 
called one who 
* 
Naturally, all citations will refer to the English texts, as designated by the fol 
lowing abbreviations: 
OI = Other Inquisitions (Clarion, 1968). 
L =r Labyrinths (New Directions, 1964). 
BOW = Borges on Writing (Dutton, 1973). 
COB = Conversations with Jorge Luis Borges (Discuss, 1970). 
In one or two instances, where the Spanish suggests the possibility of a happier English 
phraseology, I have silently changed the English. I am sure Borges would approve. 
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left some memorable endecasyllables to Argentine letters and who 
tried to reform the teaching of philosophy, purifying it of theological 
shadows and expounding in his courses the principles of Locke and 
Condillac. He died in exile; like all men, he was given bad times in 
which to live. (L, 218) 
The perfidy, the trickery of this Borges can hardly be exaggerated. This 
same ancestor?or forebear?is said in the one case to have expounded the 
philosophy of Locke and in the other to have exposed this very philosophy. 
Which side is he on? It is enough to make us wish that there were indeed 
some wr-text in Spanish that might be consulted to resolve this difficulty. 
But if we should approach the pretended Spanish "original" of this passage, 
we 
might find only that it was clearly derived from one or the other of the 
two English versions, which would settle nothing. Or we might discover in 
the Spanish some third term altogether, or possibly even another philoso 
pher, added to confound us further?Leibnitz, perhaps, or Descartes. It is 
this fear of finding myself in some cul-de-sac of pseudo-translation which 
denies me the satisfaction of examining the Spanish version, just to see 
what tricks this Borges has been up to. 
The clinching case for the Anglicism (whether British or North Ameri 
can) of this elusive author may be found in the writers he alludes to 
most frequently. There are in his works, of course, a few perfunctory 
references to Cervantes, Quevedo, and Unamuno, designed to provide a 
sort of literary local color, and there are even pseudo-allusions to South 
American authors who are probably inventions of Borges himself, like the 
notorious Honorio Bustos Domecq and B. Suarez Lynch. But the authors 
he returns to most often are a relatively small group of British men of let 
ters who were prominent at the end of the last century: G. K. Chesterton, 
Robert Louis Stevenson, Oscar Wilde, G. B. Shaw, Rudyard Kipling, and 
H. G. Wells. He knows these writers better and reads them more sympa 
thetically than most English teachers do. Can you imagine an English 
professor saying of Wilde, "He was an ingenious man who was also 
right"? (OI, 81). It is even harder to imagine an Argentine writer saying 
it. After all, not even the French, who dare to admire Poe, have gone so 
far as to admire Wilde. Even Gide only pitied him. But Borges is clearly 
steeped in the work of these British writers. They, along with the North 
Americans, Poe and Hawthorne, and a few Europeans like Kafka and 
Val?ry, are his true literary ancestors. The man may indeed, as he claims, 
have been born and raised in the Argentine?but would an Argentine 
writer have so many gauchos in his work? He himself has argued subtly 
that there are no camels in the Koran because they went without saying, 
so to speak. Well, surely, gauchos ought to be equally invisible in the 
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work of a genuinely Argentine writer. No, the man is English to the core, 
though he may indeed reside in Argentina in order to disguise his origins 
in the English fin de si?cle. 
You may now find it even more presumptuous of me to have prefaced 
these words with the title "The Reality of Borges"?but if you think my 
fictional Borges is a mere game, totally lacking in truth value, you will 
have understood neither me nor him. As he has said himself, "A false fact 
may be essentially true" (OI, 71). By sketching for you a factually false 
version of Borges, I have intended to raise some questions about the rela 
tionship between fiction and reality which he has considered himself and 
upon which he has shed as much light as any living writer. And I have also 
intended to warn you that in my less obviously false presentation of Borges 
in the remainder of this essay, there will also be a certain measure of fiction. 
But now I propose to consider what Borges has had to say about the fact/ 
fiction relationship, beginning in a very humble way by considering some 
of the instances of the word 
"reality" in his texts. My first set of illustrations 
will be taken from his essays on other writers collected in Other Inquisitions, 
where he takes up this problem on many occasions, with different emphases 
that are often quite illuminating. 
Writing of Quevedo, he introduces a persistent theme in his critical work. 
He says of one sonnet, "I shall not say that it is a transcription of reality, 
for reality is not verbal. . . ." This opposition between language and reality, 
the unbridgeable gap between them, is fundamental to the Borgesian vis 
ion, and to much of modern epistemology and poetic theory. In particular, 
the notion of a lack of contact between language and world is a character 
istic of those schools of critical thought that are usually called "formalist." 
In its extreme form this view is highly vulnerable to attacks such as that 
made by Fredric Jameson in The Prison-House of Language, for language 
is seen in this view as cutting man off from authentic experience by its arti 
ficialities and evasions. It is frequently assumed that Borges is a typical 
formalist, who holds that language is self-contained and self-sufficient 
self-referential, in fact. But this is simply not the case. Let us return to that 
statement about the Quevedo poem. In presenting it to you the first time I 
actually cut it off in mid-sentence. Here is the whole thing: 
I shall not say that it is a transcription of reality, for reality is not 
verbal, but I can say that the words are less important than the scene 
they evoke or the virile accent that seems to inform them. (OI, 40) 
Poems are made of words and reality is not, yet there is something here 
between the words and the reality which is important. In this case there 
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are 
actually two things: a "scene" evoked by the words and an "accent" 
that seems to inform them. This scene and this accent, then, are mediations 
between language and world. Born of words, they have nevertheless moved 
beyond words toward experiences. The words suggest a speaker with a 
virile accent; they imply a human being of an order of reality greater than 
their own. And they also present a scene which is realer than language, 
though it falls short of reality. These fictions or inventions, then, move 
language toward reality, not away from it. Artful writing offers a key that 
can 
open the doors of the prison-house of language. 
Borges develops this idea further in his philosophic discussion, "Avatars 
of the Tortoise": 
It is hazardous to think that a coordination of words (philosophies are 
nothing else) can have much resemblance to the universe. It is also 
hazardous to think that one of those famous coordinations does not re 
semble it a little more than the others, if only in an infinitesimal way. 
(OI, 114) 
The term "coordination of words," of course, applies equally well to philos 
ophies and stories. They are all fictions because they are verbal and the 
universe is not. But again comes the qualifying notion. Some of these co 
ordinations catch more of the universe than others. And Borges adds that, 
of those he has considered in this context, the only one in which he recog 
nizes "some vestige of the universe" is Schopenhauer's. Reading this, we 
are permitted, or even obliged, to ask by what faculty Borges or anyone 
else is capable of recognizing vestiges of the universe in a mere coordina 
tion of words. I don't want to pause and consider this question here. Or you 
might say I can't. But Borges's statement seems to imply that we are in 
touch with reality in some way, either through valid perceptions or through 
intuitions which are non-verbal. Considering this further would lead us into 
philosophical labyrinths darker than the ones Borges himself constructs, so 
let us avoid them and pick up the thread of his thought. 
Twice, when turning to the question of the relationship between language 
?especially the language of fiction?and reality, Borges has recourse to 
the same quotation from Chesterton. Summarizing Chesterton's view, he 
writes, "He reasons that reality is interminably rich and that the language 
of men does not exhaust that vertiginous treasure" (OI, 50). This position 
is very close to the others we have been considering, but here the solution 
is a bit more explicit. In both cases the quotation from Chesterton leads to 
a discussion of allegory, and in both cases Borges is cautious about reveal 
ing his own views?or perhaps he is simply uncertain of them. But he clear 
ly entertains the possibility that a certain kind of allegory may serve as the 
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vehicle that links the verbal cosmos with the greater reality. In one discus 
sion he reports that Chesterton considered allegories capable of "somehow" 
corresponding to "ungraspable reality" (OI, 50). And in the other he de 
velops the same notion somewhat more thoroughly, suggesting that allegory 
may be a useful mediator between language and reality because "it is made 
up of words but it is not a language of language, a sign of other signs" ( OI, 
155). And he adds, following Chesterton, that Dante's Beatrice, for ex 
ample, "is not a sign of the word faith; she is a sign of the active virtue 
and the secret illuminations that this word indicates?a more precise sign, 
a richer and happier sign than the monosyllable faith" (OI, 155). 
In both these discussions of allegory, Borges suggests that allegory fails 
when its fictions are reducible back to single word-concepts, but succeeds 
when its fictions function as complex signs moving away from simple con 
cepts toward the "ungraspable reality." For Borges the tendency in lan 
guage toward logic is a movement away from reality. The more precise 
and fixed the terminology, the more inadequate it must become. Thus 
allegory, at its best, is thinking in images, intuitive, and open to truth. 
Whereas logic is a kind of game, often admirable, but not likely to catch 
much of the universe in its play. An allegory like Nathaniel Hawthorne's, 
which at its best is 
"refractory, so to speak, to reason," may indeed ap 
proach the ungraspable. But Borges reproaches Hawthorne for a tendency 
toward reducing his own allegorical intuitions to mere moral fables. The 
pointing of a moral at the end of a tale is, of course, an attempt to reduce 
the complex to the simple, to substitute a concept for an image, and hence 
is a move away from the possibility of truth. "Better," he says, "are those 
pure fantasies that do not look for a justification or moral and that seem to 
have no other substance than an obscure terror" (OI, 51). 
In discussing the writer to whom he is most justly generous, he elaborates 
this notion further, making his illustrations concrete and specific. Having 
discussed the excellence of H. G. Wells as a storyteller, and recounted 
with amusement the reaction of Jules Verne to Wells's The First Men in the 
Moon (Verne "exclaimed indignantly, Il invente!'"), Borges suggests that 
Wells's achievement rests on something even more important than ingen 
uity: 
In my opinion, the excellence of Wells's first novels?The Island of Dr. 
Moreau, for example, or The Invisible Man?has a deeper origin. Not 
only do they tell an ingenious story, but they tell a story symbolic of 
processes that are somehow inherent in all human destinies. The haras 
sed invisible man who has to sleep as though his eyes were wide open 
because his eyelids do not exclude light is our solitude and our ter 
ror; the conventicle of seated monsters who mouth a servile creed in 
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their night is the Vatican and is Lhasa. Work that endures is always 
capable of an infinite and plastic ambiguity; it is all things to all men, 
like the Apostle; it is a mirror that reflects the reader's own features 
and it is also a map of the world. And it must be ambiguous in an 
evanescent and modest way, almost in spite of the author; he must 
appear to be ignorant of all symbolism. Wells displayed that lucid in 
nocence in his first fantastic exercises, which are to me the most ad 
mirable part of his admirable work. (OI, 87) 
This is one of the most perceptive and succinct paragraphs of literary 
criticism that I have encountered, and it takes us to the heart of Borges's 
notion of literary reality. Wells's work is a "mirror that reflects the reader's 
own features and it is also a map of the world." I wish to suggest that the 
two images employed here were not chosen lightly. Mirrors and maps are 
two highly different ways of imaging the world around us. They are 
also images that Borges returns to again and again in his own fiction. They 
are, of course, pointedly non-verbal signs of reality, and they are signs of dif 
ferent sorts. Mapping is based on a sign system that is highly arbitrary in 
its symbols but aspires toward an exact iconicity in its proportions. Mirrors, 
on the other hand, are superbly iconic in their reflections of reality, but 
patently artificial in at least three respects. They reduce three dimensions 
to a plane surface of two; they double distance and reduce size (our face in 
a mirror is only half its true size), and, most significantly, they reverse right 
and left. 
The distortions of maps and mirrors, because they are visible and com 
parable with the reality they image, are obvious. With language, however, 
the distortions are less obvious and therefore more sinister. Thus fiction, 
which gives us images of human situations and actions, is superior to phi 
losophy, which tries to capture these things in more abstract coordinations 
of words. Like Sidney, like Shelley, and other apologists for literature, 
Borges is answering Plato's charge that poets falsify the universe. But this 
is a more total answer and a stronger one for two reasons. Unlike the others 
it does not weaken itself by accepting the Platonic premise. Borges does not 
argue that literature points toward some eternal realm of perfect ideas. His 
argument concerns a complex human reality. And furthermore, he uses this 
complexity as the ground for an attack on philosophy itself. He denies it a 
privileged position from which to judge the value of literature. His very 
praise of philosophy robs it of its power of evaluation. Philosophy, he says, 
"dissolves reality," giving it "a kind of haziness." "I think that people who 
have no philosophy live a poor kind of life, no? People who are too sure 
about reality and about themselves. 
... I think that philosophy may give 
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the world a kind of haziness, but that haziness is all to the good" (CWB, 
156). 
Returning now to the passage on Wells, there is yet one more aspect of 
it that must be considered. The notion that art is a mirror is not a new one. 
We are all familiar with the classical view that art is a mirror held up to 
nature, and with Stendhal's more pointed version of this notion?a mirror 
being carried down a roadway, reflecting the mud below and the sky above. 
But Borges's mirror is more modest, and does only what ordinary mirrors 
do. We see in it not nature or the world but only ourselves: "it is a mirror 
that reflects the reader's own features." Of the world, art is merely a map, 
but it is a map that points accurately to things that are there in reality. In 
Wells's image of the invisible man we recognize "our own solitude and 
our terror"; and in the "conventicle of seated monsters who mouth a servile 
creed in their night" we see an image of "the Vatican" and "Lhasa." Such 
mirroring and such mapping take us deeply into reality though the images 
are 
obviously fabulations rather than transcriptions. And this is a major 
point. Reality is too subtle for realism to catch it. It cannot be transcribed 
directly. But by invention, by fabulation, we may open a way toward re 
ality that will come as close to it as human ingenuity may come. We rely 
on maps and mirrors precisely because we know their limitations and know 
how to allow for them. But fiction functions as both map and mirror at 
the same time. Its images are fixed, as the configurations of a map are 
fixed, and perpetually various, like the features reflected by a mirror, 
which never gives the same image to the same person. "Work that en 
dures," says Borges, "is capable of an infinite and plastic ambiguity." 
The world that Borges maps for us in his own fictions seems at first to 
be as strange an image of reality as the work of a medieval cartographer. 
It is a world populated mainly by gauchos and librarians, men of mindless 
brutality and others of lettered inactivity. These extremes meet, of course, 
in the figure of the detective, who both acts and ratiocinates. But for the 
most part the extremes are what Borges chooses to present to us. His map 
of the world excludes much of the middle ground of life. He concentrates 
on the fringes, where heroes and monsters, warriors and demigods, meet 
and interact. And his map abounds in cartographers, busily making their 
own maps and titling them "Reality." For Borges the ultimate futility is 
that of the creature in "The Circular Ruins" who hopes to "dream a man 
. . . with minute integrity and insert him into reality"?only to discover that 
he is himself a fiction in someone else's dream world, and not in "reality" at 
all. This vertiginous notion that the world may be a dream is perhaps what 
most people think of when they hear the name Borges. But I am trying to 
suggest that this notion is not a value held by him but a fictitious position 
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assumed by him to provoke reality into showing itself. Unlike the figure in 
"The Circular Ruins," Borges is in reality himself and knows it. The fires 
of time are consuming him, even as they are consuming us and all we per 
ceive: 
Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me 
along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me but I am the 
tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. The world, 
alas, is real; I, alas, am Borges. (L, 234; OI, 187) 
The world in all its awful reality is finally inescapable. When asked 
whether the writer has a responsibility to the world which he must dis 
charge by writing fiction that is "engaged in the political and social issues 
of the times," Borges has not answered simply, "No," with formalist dis 
dain, but spoken as follows: 
I think it is engaged all the time. We don't have to worry about that. 
Being contemporaries, we have to write in the style and mode of our 
times. If I write a story?even about the man in the moon?it would be 
an Argentine story, because I'm an Argentine; and it would fall back 
on Western civilization because that's the civilization I belong to. I 
don't think we have to be conscious about it. Let's take Flaubert's novel 
Salammb? as an example. He called it a Carthaginian novel, but any 
one can see that it was written by a nineteenth-century French realist. 
I don't suppose a real Carthaginian would make anything out of it; for 
all I know, he might consider it a bad joke. I don't think you should try 
to be loyal to your century or your opinions, because you are being 
loyal to them all the time. You have a certain voice, a certain kind of 
face, a certain way of writing, and you can't run away from them, even 
if you want to. So why bother to be modern or contemporary, since you 
can't be anything else? (BOW, 51) 
The problem for the writer is not to "represent" his own time. This he 
cannot help but do. The problem is to be like the apostle, all things to all 
men. To reach beyond reality to truth, beyond the immediate and contem 
porary to those aspects of the real which will endure and recur. No dream 
tiger ever becomes a real tiger, but the image of a man of letters struggling 
to capture the tiger's reality is an image that may still be valid when both 
men and tigers are extinct and replaced by other forms of life. The writer 
seeks this kind of durability for his work?against great odds: 
There is no exercise of the intellect which is not, in the final analysis, 
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useless. A philosophical doctrine begins as a plausible description of 
the universe; with the passage of the years it becomes a mere chapter? 
if not a paragraph or a name?in the history of philosophy. In literature 
this eventual caducity is even more notorious. (L, 43) 
These are the views of Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote, who is in 
one sense Borges's greatest hero and in another his greatest fool. By acting 
on the feelings of futility expressed in this passage, Menard has refused the 
possibilities of literary creation. He has sought to defy time by plunging 
backward through it toward seventeenth-century Spain. But his work, be 
cause it is his and to the extent that it is his, must be read as that of a fin de 
si?cle Frenchman affecting an archaic style. He is as tied to his time as 
Flaubert, even though he sought to avoid the curse of temporality by hid 
ing in the past and assuming the voice of Cervantes. Either he has no real 
ity, and is absorbed into the voice of the dead Spaniard, or he has his own, 
that of a contemporary of William James and the friend of Val?ry. Readers 
will see him as 
"brazenly pragmatic" or hopelessly relativistic. Borges is re 
minding us in this tale that there is no meaning without a meaner. Lan 
guage itself always assumes a larger context. It can never be self-referen 
tial, because in order to interpret it we must locate it in a frame of reference 
which is ineluctably temporal and cultural. The world is real and Menard, 
alas, is Menard. 
There is a further paradox here, which I have only hinted at so far, but 
which Borges himself has clearly articulated. Reality itself is real, is in time 
and subject to the same consuming fires as the creatures and things which 
constitute it. He has expressed this exquisitely in his "Parable of Cervantes 
and the Quixote," from which I quote: 
Vanquished by reality, by Spain, Don Quixote died in his native vil 
lage in the year 1614. He was survived but a short time by Miguel de 
Cervantes. 
For both of them, for the dreamer and the dreamed one, the whole 
scheme of the work consisted in the opposition of two worlds: the un 
real world of the books of chivalry, the ordinary everyday world of the 
seventeenth century. 
They did not suspect that the years would finally smooth away that 
discord, they did not suspect that La Mancha and Montiel and the 
knight's lean figure would be, for posterity, no less poetic than the epi 
sodes of Sinbad or the vast geographies of Ariosto. 
For in the beginning of literature is the myth, and in the end as well. 
(L,242) 
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Thus reality itself is a thing which fades into mythology with the passage 
of time. Or rather, most of reality fades into obscurity, and what endures is 
transformed into mythology. Truth vanishes. Fiction endures if it partakes 
of that reality beyond reality, which enables it to survive as myth. The real 
reality is that which has not yet happened but is to come. In one of his fin 
est essays, "The Modesty of History," Borges encourages us to consider this 
situation. He begins by remarking on the way that governments try to 
manufacture or simulate historical occasions with an "abundance of pre 
conditioning propaganda followed by relentless publicity" (OI, 167). But 
behind this fraudulent facade there is a "real history," which is "more mod 
est," he suggests, with "essential dates that may be, for a long time, secret." 
He cites as one instance an occasion which passed with no chronological 
marker but certainly altered the world of letters?the date when Aeschylus 
is said to have changed the shape of drama by introducing a second actor 
upon the scene. Where only the chorus and a single speaker had appeared, 
on some "remote spring day, in that honey-colored theater" a second figure 
took up a position on stage, and with this event, 
came the dialogue and the infinite possibilities of the reaction of some 
characters to others. A prophetic spectator would have seen that multi 
tudes of future appearances accompanied him: Hamlet and Faust and 
Segismundo and Macbeth and Peer Gynt and others our eyes cannot 
yet discern." (OI, 168) 
This was a truly historic occasion because the future ratified it and 
made it such. In the same essay Borges then speaks of another occasion, this 
one not in the world of letters but in that of heroic action. When the Vikings 
invaded England in the eleventh century, led by Harald Sigurdarson and 
Tostig, the brother of England's Saxon King Harold, there occurred a con 
frontation in which the English King spoke words of great valor and fol 
lowed them with deeds that led to the death of the two invading chieftains 
and a great victory for the Saxons. As recorded almost two centuries later 
by the Icelandic historian Snorri Sturlason, this confrontation has what 
Borges calls "the fundamental flavor of the heroic," which he considers a 
value in itself. But he adds, 
Only one thing is more admirable than the admirable reply of the 
Saxon King: that an Icelander, a man of the lineage of the vanquished, 
has perpetuated the reply. It is as if a Carthaginian had bequeathed 
to us the memory of the exploit of Regulus. Saxo Grammaticus wrote 
with justification in his Gesta Danorum: "The men of Thule [Iceland] 
are very fond of learning and of recording the history of all peoples 
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and they are equally pleased to reveal the excellences of others or of 
themselves." 
Not the day when the Saxon said the words, but the day when an 
enemy perpetuated them, was the historic date. A date that is a proph 
ecy of something still in the future: the day when races and nations will 
be cast into oblivion, and the solidarity of all mankind will be estab 
lished. The offer owes its virtue to the concept of a fatherland. By 
relating it, Snorri surmounts and transcends that concept. (OI, 169-70) 
Thus politics, wars, exchanges of words and sword-thrusts, are saved from 
oblivion by the historian who turns them into instances of heroic myth, 
and by doing so offers us a glimpse of a humanity beyond nationalistic 
pride. The men of heroic action need the men of letters if they and their 
deeds are to survive. And the men of letters need the heroic actors in order 
to keep their letters alive. The gaucho on the pampas and the librarian in 
Buenos Aires are the parts of a mythical beast, a kind of centaur, each 
needing the other for completion. 
History, for Borges, is a matter of witnessing as much as a matter of do 
ing. The forms of the past are preserved in frail human vessels which are 
themselves destined to die?and these deaths, too, are historic though un 
recorded. In his parable of "The Witness" Borges writes, 
In time there was a day that extinguished the last eyes to see Christ; 
the battle of Junin and the love of Helen died with the death of a man. 
What will die with me when I die, what pathetic or fragile form will 
the world lose? The voice of Macedonio Fern?ndes, the image of a red 
horse in the vacant lot at Serrano and Charcas, a bar of sulphur in the 
drawer of a mahogany desk? (L, 243) 
Here, in accents reminiscent of Pater, Borges reminds us not of the in 
tractability of reality but of the fragility of it. How it resides in little things 
as well as great, and how they pass away, and how finally even those who 
have seen them pass away as well. And though Borges can mention the 
voice of Macedonio Fern?ndes, his words will never capture that voice. 
What they will convey, however, is something even more fragile: his feel 
ing about the voice. And this, too, is a kind of reality and not the least kind. 
Approaching the end of an essay or a lecture, one's thoughts turn to 
ward conclusions. Speaker and spectator glance surreptitiously at clocks 
and watches, both, perhaps, looking forward to release from the rigidity of 
their r?les. Still, there is a painful dimension to conclusions, which has ani 
mated one of Borges's finest poems, "L?mites," which like much of his lit 
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erary work is about something very real indeed. Speaking of that poem to 
Richard B?rgin, he observed, 
It's quite easy to write an original poem, let's say, with original 
thoughts or surprising thoughts. I mean, if you think, that's what the 
metaphysical poets did in England, no? But in the case of "L?mites," I 
have had the great luck to write a poem about something that every 
body has felt or may feel. For example, what I am feeling today in 
Cambridge?I am going tomorrow to New York and won't be back until 
Wednesday or Tuesday and I feel that I am doing things for the last 
time. 
And yet, I mean that most common feelings, most human feelings, 
have found their way into poetry and been worked over and over again, 
as they should have been, for the last thousand years. But here I've 
been very lucky, because having a long literary past, I mean, having 
read in many literatures, I seem to have found a subject that is fairly 
new and yet a subject that is not thought extravagant. Because when I 
say, especially at a certain age, that we are doing many things for the 
last time and may not be aware of it?for all I know I may be looking 
out of this window for the last time, or there are books that I shall 
never read, books that I have already read for the last time?I think 
that I have opened, let's say, the door, to a feeling that all men have. 
(COB, 90, 91) 
The value of the poem is seen by Borges as less in its originality than in 
its universality: "something that everybody has felt, or may feel"?a senti 
ment that brings Borges very close to Samuel Johnson. There is a reality of 
shared human experiences, then, that justifies poems and fictions by their 
encompassing it. Far from being self-referential or a labyrinthine cul-de 
sac, poem and story exist to bridge the gap between people and things?and 
between one person and another. In this connection it is interesting to ob 
serve that Borges's poem bears a startling resemblance to a fugitive piece 
written by Johnson himself?Idler 103, the closing paper in the Idler series, 
in which he speculates on the phenomenon of finality: 
Though the Idler and his readers have contracted no close friendship, 
they are perhaps both unwilling to part. There are few things not pure 
ly evil, of which we can say, without some emotion of uneasiness, this 
is the last. Those who never could agree together, shed tears when mu 
tual discontent has determined them to final separation; of a place 
which has been frequently visited, though without pleasure, the last look 
is taken with heaviness of heart; and the Idler, with all his chilness of 
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tranquility, is not wholly unaffected by the thought that his last essay is 
now before him. 
This secret horror of the last is inseparable from a thinking being, 
whose life is limited, and to whom death is dreadful. 
I do not mean to suggest that Borges, like Pierre Menard, has been trying 
to rewrite Dr. Johnson. Quite the opposite. For, though their subjects are 
quite similar, they are each irrevocably of their time, in style and emphasis, 
and in those unspoken values that inform style and emphasis. What links 
them despite these differences is reality itself, and in particular the human 
condition of that reality. And Johnson, I am sure, would applaud Borges's 
most succinct statement of his position in this matter. Literature, he has 
said, "is not a mere juggling of words" (BOW, 164). It requires that a 
writer have what Chesterton called 
"everything." A notion which Borges 
glosses in the following way: 
To a writer this everything is more than an encompassing word; it is 
literal. It stands for the chief, for the essential, human experiences. For 
example, a writer needs loneliness, and he gets his share of it. He needs 
love, and he gets shared and also unshared love. He needs friendship. 
In fact, he needs the universe. (BOW, 163) 
And the universe?the universe of men and women at any rate?needs the 
writer. We need him to say the big things, of course, but also the little ones: 
things like, "Perhaps a bird was singing and I felt for him a small, birdlike 
affection" (OI, 180). And when I say the writer I mean specifically the one 
who is called Jorge Luis Borges, for whom many people in many lands feel 
a 
strong human affection, and of whom it is very appropriate to speak in 
precisely the same language in which he spoke of H. G. Wells. Referring to 
Wells's early scientific romances, Borges wrote: 
I think they will be incorporated, like the fables of Theseus or Ahasuer 
us, into the general memory of the species and even transcend the fame 
of their creator or the extinction of the language in which they were 
written." (OI, 88) 
So be it. 
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